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Recent Decisions
Chattel Mortgage - Possession By Mortgagee Pursuant
To Void Mortgage - Effect On Creditors. Haskins v. Dube,
138 A. 2d 677 (N.H., 1958). A mortgagor gave a recorded
chattel mortgage on present and after acquired stock in
trade, retaining possession for sale in his usual course of
business, without having to account to the mortgagee for
the proceeds. The mortgagee bought in at a valid foreclosure sale and took constructive possession of the stock
with the knowledge of the plaintiff, a general creditor of
the mortgagor, the defendant. Subsequently the stock in
trade was attached by the plaintiff and sold at public auction, the proceeds thereof being held by the sheriff pending the outcome of this litigation, in which the mortgagee
intervened. The trial court ruled that the creditor's claim
was superior to that of the mortgagee. The mortgagee took
exception and was sustained by the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire. The general rule that the mortgagor's right to
sell without accounting renders the chattel mortgage invalid may be relaxed in those cases where the mortgagee
has obtained possession before other creditors of the mortgagor have attached the goods. The mortgagee's superior
rights in the after acquired property, even though such a
provision may be good only between the parties, was also
upheld contingent upon the mortgagee taking possession
prior to attaching creditors.
The authorities are in conflict as to whether a mortgage,
.originally void as to creditors, is validated by the mortgagee taking possession before attachment by the creditors. 10 Am. Ju., Chattel Mortgages, 821, 828, §§162, 170.
The cases are collected in 25 L. R. A. (N.S.) 110. In Maryland, since 1939, certain chattel mortgages on after acquired goods, are valid, 2 MD. CODE (1957), Art. 21, §52.
See Grimes v. Clark, 234 F. 604 (4th Cir., 1916), which
allowed the trustee in bankruptcy to prevail over a mortgagee who had taken possession of the goods six days before the bankruptcy petition, pursuant to a mortgage on
after acquired property (which was then void in Maryland). Cf. Edelhoff v. Horner-Miller Mfg. Co., 86 Md. 595,
612, 39 A. 314 (1898).
Damages - Supervisory Expenses - Overhead As Part
Of Cost Of Production. Apex Metal Stamping Co. v.
Alexander & Sawyer, Inc. 48 N. J. S. 476, 138 A. 2d 568
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(1958). The defendant prevented the plaintiff from fully
performing an agreement between them for the manufacture of tire stands. The lower court, in awarding damages
on the basis of contract price minus the costs of production,
did not include the value of suprevisory services in the cost
of production. On appeal the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Appellate Division, held that the initial assumption is that
the value of supervisory services and other overhead must
be included in the measurement of the cost of production.
Nevertheless, the obligor can disprove this presumption by
showing, first, that he did not realize any automatic pecuniary saving through release of supervisory personnel; and
second, he did not realize any other compensating advantage from the default, such as being able to accept new
contractual obligations which would not have been in the
capacity of his supervisory personnel if the contract in
question had to be completed. In accordance with this holding, the court remanded the case for further proceedings
in order to allow the plaintiff an opportunity to disprove
the aforementioned initial assumption.
In M & R Contractors& Builders v. Michael, 138 A. 2d
350, 358 (Md., 1958), the Maryland Court of Appeals held
pursuant to MARYLAND RULE 885, that, where it could be
shown that a builder has been prevented from performing
his contractual obligation and that his entire time would
have been required for the performance thereof, any gain
he might make with reasonable efforts, without being subjected to additional risk of loss or injury, and which gain
he could not realize had he not been discharged from the
defendant's contract, must be deducted from the plaintiff's
damages. However, if the defendant cannot show that the
builder's entire time was required for the completion of
the contract in question, any gain which the builder made
from another contract which he took on either before or
immediately after the repudiation should not be considered
in reducing his recovery of full damages.
The above decisions seem to be contrary to the prevailing view as expressed in Olds v. Mapes-Reeve Const. Co.,
177 Mass. 41, 58 N. E. 478 (1900), in which case the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the gain received by a sub-contractor for completing a project, on
behalf of the owner, after the contractor had repudiated
his contract with the subcontractor, should not have been
considered in reducing his recovery of full damages.
Other cases in point are collected in 50 A. L. R. 1397
and 15 AM. JuR., Damages, 575, §158.
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Insurance - Effect Of Renunciation Of Life Insurance
Policy By Beneficiary In Divorce Property Settlement.
Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Broadhurst,
321 P. 2d 75 (Cal., 1958). Plaintiff brought this interpleader action to determine conflicting claims involved in a
life insurance policy. The insured had changed the beneficiary three times and at the time of his death the defendant, the insured's ex-wife, remained the policy beneficiary.
However, in a property settlement executed upon the
divorce of defendant and decedent, defendant transferred
"to husband any interest she may have in the life insurance
policy on the life of the husband" (77). The beneficiary
had not been changed since the divorce. The insured's
administratrix claimed that the effect of the property settlement was a waiver of defendant's right to the proceeds.
The lower court's judgment for defendant was affirmed on
appeal. Since the insured had changed the beneficiary
several times before the divorce, his failure to make any
changes afterwards indicated that he intended the defendant to have the proceeds.
There appears to be no Maryland decision directly in
point on the question of whether a property settlement is
an effective renunciation of a life insurance policy by the
beneficiary. But see Daly v. Daly, 138 Md. 155, 162, 113 A.
643 (1921), recognizing three situations which stand as
exceptions to the general rule that exact compliance with
the regulations of the insurer is necessary to perfect a
change of beneficiary, where: (1) strict compliance is
waived by the insurer, (2) literal compliance by the insured is impossible, and (3) insured has taken all the necessary steps but dies before the new certificate is issued. Note
also the language in Reid v. Durboraw, 272 F. 99, 101 (4th
Cir., 1921): ". . . the power to change the beneficiary is a
power of appointment, and the terms of its exercise are
fixed by the contract between the insurer and the insured....
The court has no power to change that contract
by changing the conditions upon which the exercise of the
power of appointment is limited." The cases are collected
in 175 A. L. R. 1220, 1242. This annotation, dealing with the
effect of a divorce on the wife's right to take the proceeds
of a life insurance policy when she has specifically renounced the right in a property settlement, shows that generally where the insured has not taken the necessary steps
to change the beneficiary, the renunciation will be ineffective. However, where it was shown that the beneficiary
gave up her rights for a valuable consideration, even though
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the insured did not perfect a change of beneficiary, the provision in a property settlement will constitute a waiver.
Joint Tenants - Survivorship Rights To Real Property
After Murder Of One Joint Tenant By Other. In Re Foster's
Estate, 182 Kan. 315, 320 P. 2d 855 (1958). The husband was
convicted of the murder of his wife, who died intestate. Before his conviction he sold two lots that he and his wife had
held as joint tenants. The wife's administrator sought to
quash the sale on the ground that a Kansas statute, which
provided that no one convicted of a felony will be allowed to
share in the estate of the victim, applied in this situation.
Judgment for the grantees was affirmed on appeal, the
court construing the statute strictly, and rejecting the admittedly equitable basis of the administrator's claim. The
court held that the surviving joint tenant takes the property under the original conveyance, and not as a new acquisition under intestate succession. The statutory prohibition, therefore, did not apply because the property never
became part of the wife's estate.
While there is no Maryland decision directly in point
on this question of joint tenancy, the Maryland Court of
Appeals in the leading case of Pricev. Hitaffer, 164 Md. 505,
165 A. 470 (1933), applied the general common law principle that disqualifies a murderer from profiting by his
crime. The Court said that neither a murderer nor his heirs
will be permitted to share in the estate of the victim. In a
joint tenancy death of one tenant merely leaves the surviving joint tenant with his original estate in the property
freed from the participation of the deceased tenant, 48
C. J. S.; Joint Tenants, 910, §1. However, this technical distinction has not been adhered to in many jurisdictions. The
decisions are in conflict and a variety of solutions have been
applied. See 32 A. L. R. 2d 1099. A study of the results will
be found in 17 Md. L. Rev. 45 (1957).
Maryland Retail Instalment Act - What Constitutes
Collateral Security. United States v. Bland, 159 F. Supp.
395 (D. Md., 1958). Defendant purchased for $727 several
storm windows and doors on the instalment plan and
executed a promissory note, which the vendor endorsed
without recourse to the Bank. Despite an unfavorable
credit report on defendant, the Bank discounted the note
to the vendor. The Government guaranteed the Bank payment pursuant to the National Housing Act, 12 U. S. C. A.
(1957) §1701 et seq., which indemnifies home improvement
loans. Defendant, discovering that the total cost would be
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$100 more than the contract price, due to finance charges,
defaulted in payments. The Government brought suit to
recover the balance due. It was conceded that there was
no compliance with the Maryland Retail Instalment Act,
7 MD. CODE (1957), Art. 83, §§128 et seq. If the instant transaction was covered by the Act, then the contract and sale
were void from inception. An instalment sale comes within
the purview of the Act if the vendor has taken "collateral
security for the buyer's obligation" (§152). Plaintiff contended that no such "collateral security" was present, since
the guarantee ran from the Government to the Bank and
not to the seller. Judgment was for defendant. The fact
that the guarantee did not go directly to the vendor is immaterial in view of the close relationships involved in the
transaction. The evidence showed that the vendor would
not have sold the storm windows to defendant unless the
former had been assured that the Bank would purchase
the note without recourse, and that the Bank would not
have purchased the note had the Government not guaranteed it against loss. The Bank worked closely with the
dealers in an effort to get as much of this profitable business
as possible. The purpose of the Act was to protect improvident instalment buyers from unscrupulous practices.
Reformation Of Instruments - Applicability Of Parol
Evidence Rule And Statute Of Frauds. Smalley v. Rogers,
100 S. 2d 118 (Miss., 1958). Plaintiff owned certain surface
lands plus one half of the mineral rights. He conveyed
these lands to X by warranty deed with no mention of the
mineral rights. Both parties understood that plaintiff reserved a one quarter interest in such rights. X conveyed
to defendant with the written stipulation that the conveyance was subject to such prior reservations of minerals as
were reserved by former grantors. Plaintiff brought this
action to reform the deed from him to X to include the
mineral reservations. Plaintiff and X both testified as to
their intent and that defendant had oral notice of the
reservation. Defendant argued that parol evidence showing the intention of the parties to the deed should not be
admissible as the deed was plain and unambiguous. The
trial court granted the reformation and the decree was
affirmed on appeal. When the ground of reform is mutual
mistake, an action for reformation of an instrument is outside the field of operation of the parol evidence rule.
See Hoffman v. Chapman, 182 Md. 208, 34 A. 2d 438
(1943), holding that the Statute of Frauds is inapplicable
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in a suit for reformation of an instrument. Note also the
recent enunciation by the Court of Appeals of New York
in Brandwein v. Provident Mutual Life Ins. Co. of Phila.,
3 N. Y. 2d 491, 146 N. E. 2d 693 (N. Y. 1957). Plaintiff sought
to reform an employment contract, alleging he signed it
relying on the oral promise of defendant that a clause for
renewal commissions which was omitted from the contract
would be recorded on the company's official records. The
court, in allowing plaintiff relief, held (6-1) that this was
more than an oral side agreement to the written contract
(which would be inadmissible under the statute of frauds)
since plaintiff's signature was procured by fraudulent
representation.
Sales - Suit On Express Warranty - No Privity Of
Contract. Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Oh. St.
244, 147 N. E. 2d 612 (1958). Plaintiff purchased from a retailer a hair preparation packed in a sealed container which
was manufactured by the defendant. This product was nationally advertised by defendant manufacturer as being safe
for application to the body when used properly. In applying the preparation as directed to her person, plaintiff was
injured. Defendant contended that plaintiff could not base
her suit on breach of warranty as there was no privity of
contract between the parties. Judgment for defendant was
reversed at the intermediate appellate level and this reversal was sustained by the Supreme Court of Ohio. The
Court recognized that the prevailing view in Ohio required
privity of contract where an action is brought on an express
or implied warranty. However, an increasing number of
jurisdictions have excepted to this rule in the case of food
and beverages, holding that the warranty carried over from
manufacturer to consumer. Therefore, the Ohio Court felt
it only logical to bring cosmetics sold in sealed packages
within the exception, as the public relies solely on the
manufacturer's representations, with the retailer being a
mere conduit of distribution.
The Maryland Court of Appeals has uniformly held
that in the absence of privity of contract an action ex
contractu based on a warranty will not lie. Vaccarino v.
Cozzubo, 181 Md. 614, 616, 31 A. 2d 316 (1943). The Maryland Court has allowed recovery in tort where there is no
privity in cases involving food and beverages based on the
manufacturer's failure to perform his duty to exercise the
highest degree of care to see that his product is fit for consumption as represented, Coca Cola Bottling Wks. v. Catron,
186 Md. 156, 46 A. 2d 303 (1946) (mouse in bottle) and
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Cloverland Farms Dairy v. Ellin, 195 Md. 663, 75 A. 2d 116
(1950) (kerosene in bottle). Note MD. LAws 1958, Ch. 94,

which amends the Uniform Sales Act, 7

MD. CODE

(1957)

Art. 83, Sec. 94(1) to include in the definition of "sale" the
serving of food for human consumption for compensation
(effective June 1, 1958). For further privity of contract
discussion see 13 Md. L. Rev. 154, 161 (1953), 14 Md. L.
Rev. 77 (1954) and 18 Md. L. Rev. 80 (1958).
Statute Of Frauds - Performance Within One Year.
Hall v. Hall, 308 S. W. 2d 12 (Tex. 1957). The parties entered into an oral contract, not specifying any time for
performance whereby plaintiff was to "develop" a sales
territory for products made by defendant. After two years,
defendant repudiated the contract when plaintiff had spent
$17,000 of his own money to develop the territory. Plaintiff
sued for accrued commissions and damages for the loss of
expected future commissions. The parties conceded that
it was implied that the contract was to run for a reasonable
time. Plaintiff contended that a contract, the term of which
is a reasonable time, is one of uncertain duration and therefore not within the statute of frauds, for it can be performed
within one year. The jury found that the contract was to
run for a reasonable time of three years. The trial court's
finding against plaintiff as to expected future commissions
was reversed on appeal, but reinstated by the Supreme
Court of Texas. In some cases, it is correct to say that a
contract is not within the statute of frauds if no period for
performance is stated. But this principle is inapplicable
to contracts, the implied term of which is a reasonable time.
In such cases "reasonable" must be defined in units of
time (here, three years). The effect of this determination is
to incorporate it into the contract, just as if the term had
been originally stated therein. Reasonable time, therefore,
is not a term of uncertain duration. Since the contract in
the instant case was to run for three years, it is within the
statute of frauds and unenforceable.
In Maryland a contract is not within the statute of
frauds if it can, by any possibility, be completed within a
year, although the parties may have intended that its operation should extend through a much longer period. Home
News, Inc. v. Goodman, 182 Md. 585, 594-5, 35 A. 2d 442
(1944), and cases cited therein. For a strict application of
this statute of frauds section see Ellicott v. Peterson, 4 Md.
476 (1853), which held that an oral agreement to reimburse
the plaintiff for expenses he incurs to support grandchildren
was not within the statute of frauds as the grandchildren
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could have died within a year. See 129 A. L. R. 534 discussing the statute of frauds relating to performance within
one year, where such performance is improbable or almost
impossible. Where one of the parties has substantially
changed his position in reliance on an oral contract, an
increasing number of counts have applied the doctrine of
estoppel, thus preventing the defense of the statute of
frauds. Monarco v. Lo Greco, 35 Cal. 2d 621, 220 Pac. 2d
737, 739 (1950).
Streets And Highways - Obstruction Of The Public
Way. 46 South 52nd Street Corporationv. Manlin, 26 Law
Week 2493 (Pa. Ct. of Com. Pls., Phila., Pa. 1958). Plaintiff
brought suit to enjoin defendant from operating a newsstand on the sidewalk abutting plaintiff's store. Plaintiff
owned to the middle of the street, subject to the public
easement. The court held that because of the need for dissemination of newspapers to the widest possible extent
and because of the size and variety of news media today,
a newsstand was a reasonable use of the public easement,
being essential to the dissemination of news. This case followed the decision of an earlier Pennsylvania case, Wilson
v. McGill, 42 Pa. D. & C. 74 (1940), which adopted the view
that newsstands which do not in fact impede public travel
are not a nuisance but rather a necessity and have become
a well established custom meeting an urgent public need.
Contra to these holdings, the reported cases have consistently found newsstands to be a continuing nuisance
which obstruct the public way and not within the scope of
the public easement in the street. The majority of decisions
proceed from the general proposition that no private person has a right to obstruct the street for a private business.
People v. Buck, 193 App. Div. 262, 184 N. Y. S. 210 (1920),
and Cowin v. City of Waterloo, 237 Iowa 202, 21 N. W. 2d
705 (1946). Lunchwagons (permanent or portable) have
also been considered obstructions of the public way and
consequently removable as nuisances. See 4 A. L. R. 346.
But at least one English court appears to have reached a
different result. Rex v. Bartholomew, 1 K. B. 554, 77
L. J. K. B. N. S. 275 (1908). Also Henkel v. City of Detroit,
49 Mich. 249, 13 N. W. 611, 615 (1882), in upholding the
use of a public street for a market place, as authorized by
the municipality, stated: "City streets are not laid out for
the passage of persons and vehicles exclusively, but for
all the other purposes to which it is customary to devote
them." The Maryland Court of Appeals has not dealt with
newsstands specifically or obstructions generally but in
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holding that a gas pump near a curb may constitute a
nuisance which the municipal corporation may remove,
Judge Delaplaine said, "[s]ince the right of the public to use
the streets in a proper manner is absolute and paramount,
they must be kept free from all nuisances, obstructions, and
encroachments which destroy or materially impair their
use as public highways." Adams v. Commissioners of
Trappe, 204 Md. 165, 171, 102 A. 2d 830 (1954). For further
discussion of obstructions of street and sidewalk see 105
A. L. R. 1051, 1061, 163 A. L. R. 1334, 1341, and 64 C. J. S.,
Municipal Corporations, 224, §1774b.
Torts - Duty Of Landowner To Warn Tenant Of Dangerous Natural Conditions. Hersch v. Anderson Acres, 146
N. E. 2d 648 (Ohio, 1957). The plaintiff, while renting
trailer space on a camping site owned and operated by the
defendant, suffered infections about her body and head due
to poison ivy and poison oak, which the defendant allowed
to exist upon the premises. The plaintiff contended that
the defendant was negligent in failing to remove and in
allowing the noxious weeds to exist. The trial court granted
the defendant's motion for a directed verdict. The Court of
Common Pleas of Ohio, Erie County, in sustaining the judgment of the lower court, held that the owner and operator
of a camp site owes no duty to his tenants to warn them
of or remove poison ivy, poison oak or other obnoxious
weeds; a person using such facilities assumes the risks of
the natural hazards of the outdoors.
Although the Maryland Court of Appeals has never
specifically dealt with the problem of injuries occurring to
invitees from poisonous weeds existent on the land of the
invitor, in Beverly Beach Club v. Marron, 172 Md. 471, 192
A. 278 (1937), the court held that the owner and operator
of a public beach owed no more than a duty of ordinary
care and diligence in removing dangerous objects from the
beach, and that the defendant was not negligent by failing
to locate and remove a sharp instrument from the swimming area. Jones v. City of Aberdeen, Maryland, 138 F.
Supp. 727 (D. Md., 1956), held that when a tenant leases
property, knowing the general nature and incidence of the
land which are open and apparent, he takes the property as
it is at the time. See also, Le Vonas v. Acme Paper Board
Co., 184 Md. 16, 40 A. 2d 43 (1944), for a good statement of
the Maryland law: that a landlord is not liable for injuries
occurring to an invitee where the injuries resulted from
dangers which are as obvious or familiar to the injured
person as to the landlord.
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Torts - Intentional Infliction Of Mental Suffering By
Verbal Assault. Slocum v. Food Fair Stores of Florida,
100 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 1958) Plaintiff customer asked a clerk
in defendant's store the price of an item. He replied, "If
you want to know the price, you'll have to find out the best
way you can * * * you stink to me." Plaintiff brought suit
to recover for mental suffering and an ensuing heart attack
as a result of the clerk's insults, the theory of her case being
the intentional infliction of emotional distress. Judgment
for defendant was affirmed on appeal. In reviewing the
general law in this area, the court noted that RESTATEMENT,
TORTS, (1948 Supp.) §46 approves the liability of one who
intentionally, and without privilege, causes severe emotional distress to another. This rule requires a distinction
between conduct likely to cause mere emotional distress
and that causing severe emotional distress. The former
includes simple vulgarities, indignities or bad manners;
the latter, comments so clearly noxious as to exceed all
bounds tolerated by society. Because of this nebulous

standard, some courts have rejected the

RESTATEMENT

doc-

trine in toto. It is true, however, that a stricter duty of
courtesy has been placed on businesses of a quasi-public
nature: common carriers, theatres, hotels, and telegraph
companies. 15 A. L. R. 2d 108, 136. The court concluded
that even if it assumed, without deciding, that the Restatement rule was the law in Florida, the facts of the instant
case could not come within the scope of that doctrine.
There appear to be no Maryland Court of Appeals cases
on verbal assault unaccompanied by an independent tort.
But see Zolet v. Reservoir ConstructionCorp., Daily Record,
Dec. 9, 1957 (Sup. Ct. of Balto. City). Plaintiff brought
suit to recover for intentional infliction of severe emotional
distress and physical injuries resulting therefrom due to
the alleged verbal assault of the defendant (from whom
plaintiff had purchased a house), to wit: "'Your husband
is a son of a bitch. All I wish for you and your family is
death, disease and pestilence.'" Defendant's demurrer was
sustained. After an extensive summary of the case law
and treatises on the subject, Judge Allen concluded that
the insulting words did not" 'go beyond all possible bounds
of decency ...to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community' ", which requirement
is necessary for a valid cause of action.
Trusts - Substitution Of Trustee Constitutionally Incapable Of Administering According To Settlor's Intent.
In Re GirardCollege Trusteeship,391 Pa.434, 138 A. 2d 844
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(1958), appeal pending to the United States Supreme Court.
The will of Stephen Girard in 1831 appointed the City of
Philadelphia the trustee of an endowment fund for the
building and maintenance of an "Orphan Establishment"
for the care and education of "poor white male orphan
children." Pursuant to this direction Girard College was
founded and has since been administered by the statutorily
created Board of Directors of City Trusts of Philadelphia,
which in 1954 denied admission to two Negro male orphans
on the basis of the racial limitation in Girard's will. The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the Orphan's
Court order rejecting the applicants' admission. 386 Pa. 548,
127 A. 2d 287 (1956). The Supreme Court of the United
States reversed on the ground that the action of the Board
of City Trusts, being an agency of the State, was a discrimination by the State against Negroes which is prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment. The cause was
remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with the
opinion. Pennsylvania v. Board of Trusts, 353 U. S. 230
(1957). The Orphan's Court subsequently entered decrees
removing the Board of City Trusts as trustee of Girard
College and substituted therefor a board of thirteen private
citizens not affiliated with the State government. Petitioner
contended that the effect of the Supreme Court decision
was to require Girard College to admit the petitioners. The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania sustained the decrees, 4-1.
The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States
was interpreted to mean that the Board of City Trusts,
being a State agency, was constitutionally incapable of
administering Girard College in strict compliance with the
founder's prescribed racial restrictions on admissions without violating the Fourteenth Amendment. Since this decision only affected the trustee and not the trust, the judgment of the Orphan's Court in substituting a trustee not
acting for the State was in accord and consistent with the
Supreme Court decision. It is settled trust law that when
a trustee is unable to administer a trust in accordance with
the lawful directions and intent of the settlor, a new trustee
may be substituted by the proper court to enforce and
perfect the objects of the trust. The Pennsylvania Court
could find no constitutional sanctions against a private
trust discriminating on the basis of color, race or creed.
Petitioners' argument that Girard College had taken on
a "public character" and was therefore subject to the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment was rejected. A
trust created for a private purpose cannot become public
because of the mode of administration.

